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Introduction
Within the past twenty years, Ethiopia has been slowly rising in the ranks within the
global community, which have led historians to consider Ethiopia as a political force to be
reckoned with. Historically speaking, Ethiopia’s former name was the Abyssinia Empire, but is
generally understood to be one of the oldest civilizations. Including the infamous Lucy, other
remains have been found in Ethiopia, including what scientists consider to be the stem for the
Homo genus (Powell 2015). Another historical perspective for Ethiopia contains it’s biblical
importance in the Old Testament with the mention of Queen Sheba and King Solomon, who
began the Menelik dynasty and the Ethiopian Empire (Monges 2002).
Some may argue that the country’s historical perseverance was the beginning of
Ethiopia’s pan-Africanism, in addition to escaping the grasps of colonialism. The country’s
weight in the African continent only continued as it became home to the Organization of African
Unity and eventually the African Union (Ani 2017). In more modern terms, Ethiopia’s economic
growth is also another factor to demonstrate their rising superiority within the international
community. According to the World Bank, Ethiopia’s growth over the past decade has lifted the
gross national product to an average of 10% per year. This is only theorized to increase with the
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) being built on Ethiopia’s Blue Nile. This project is
primary funded by Ethiopian citizens and is expected to generate 5,520 megawatts of electricity
which will allow the government to sell surplus electricity (Tafirenyika 2015).
It is by considering these facts, that this project considers Ethiopia’s potential to be a
rising regional power within the Horn of Africa.
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Abstract

This study analyzes Ethiopia’s potential to be considered a rising regional power in East
Africa. This project began with a qualitative analysis considering literature on hegemony, and
broadly accepted regional powers within the international community. It then considers regional
powers within the African context (Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa) to gain an understanding in
how the existing literature fits within Africa. The second substantial chapter then considers
prominent Ethiopian leaders whose legacy is still felt in the 21 st century, including individuals
such as Emperor Menelik and Haile Selassie. This analysis shows Ethiopia’s complex history
which complicates the country’s ability to be labeled a rising regional power, especially with the
rising ethnic violence.
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Literature Review:
I.

Introduction:
When considering the major political powers within the international sphere, the most

common answers tend to be focused around developed and industrial nations. By focusing on
those specific countries, this approach limits the consideration of developing countries. While the
former dominates political discussion over power, the latter are treated as a second thought
within popular discourse in political science. This project seeks to widen our understanding of
power in the international system by focusing on regional powers, specifically outside of the
Western World. Fueled by the lack of diversity when considering power, this research paper
turns to analyze Ethiopia and the country’s potential to be considered a regional power. With its
cultural history, ability to combat colonial influence, and potential to control Africa’s largest
body of water (the Nile), Ethiopia is rightfully situated to fit the criteria for a country rising in
power.
The goal of this chapter is to begin the analysis by conceptualizing regionalism and what it
means to be a regional power. By focusing on literature that discusses common actors within the
regional discussion, I will draw out characteristics that are shared amongst these states. The next
chapter will take a broader approach and consider regionalism within the African context. Before
embarking on this journey for considering Ethiopia’s potential to be labeled East Africa’s
prominent regional power, it is crucial to understand the common terminology used within
international relations literature about power, hegemony, and regional powers. However, due to
overuse of these terms throughout history, there is variety in what is considered to be the true
definition. This complicates discussions within IR as analysts use the same terminology but are
referring to different concepts.

6

This literature review will begin by aiming to understand various theories on hegemony and
regional powers. Political scientists tend to turn to countries such as India, Brazil, and China
when considering rising regional countries. Throughout this literature review, I will show how
these theories are applied and found within those countries.
II.

Defining Hegemony
To have a true understanding about Ethiopia’s place on the global field, it is important to

comprehend what power means on the international scale. With rising powers, it is clear that the
distribution of power is a dynamic concept that is constantly changing. Regionalism and
international stability are strongly assessed by the influence of dominant powers to maintain
influence or for subordinate states to successfully threaten the status quo.
Defining hegemony is difficult as it has multiple uses within political science. It is used as a
synonym for both leadership and empires. Within various schools of political thought it is
considered to be a normatively loaded term (Destradi 2010). The weight, and power behind
‘hegemony’ is often associated with major political entities that have abused their influence in
the world to further enforce their dominance. Now, with the rise of ‘southern’ states such as
China, India, Brazil, and South Africa, scholars have turned to find an operational definition to
hegemony. A definition that would assist in classifying and sorting these rising powers, based on
their proximity to ‘hegemonic’ status. It is this endeavor that shined a light into the lack of
consensus behind a definition for the term. Most literature focuses on a state’s rise to power, and
their interactions but there is minimal focus of analyzing and predicting their involvement in
shaping their regional order. The aim of this paper is to fill that gap by understanding Ethiopia’s
potential and apply this theoretical information into understanding the future for the Horn of
Africa.
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The most significant contributions to the concept of hegemony was done by Antonio
Gramsci on cultural hegemony. The Gramsci perspective focused on establishing hegemony as a
process where there is “spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the population by the
dominant fundamental group” (Lears 1985). In other words, this can be applied to political
theory by understanding that hegemons aim to establish a new order with a universal ideology
which aligns their interests with those around them. To successfully become a hegemon, it
depends on the ability of the actor to form alliances with surrounding states. In most cases, this is
considered hard hegemony with a subtle form of domination without the clear use of force. In
contrast, intermediate hegemonic strategy is seen with material benefits and rewards for their
subordinates (Destradi 2010)
III.

Defining Regional Powers
The focus in the literature shifted from hegemony to regional powers after the Cold War,

when the world wanted to understand and create a space for regional powers to emerge as key
actors. Instead of looking towards the two major powers in the East-West dichotomy during the
Cold War, the rise of regional powers became relevant as the developing countries were now
expected to take care of conflicts within their own backyard in the post-Cold War era. This trust
soon turned into an expectation for these regional countries to speak and step up once their
neighbors acted in manners that caused tension on the global scale. A prime example of this
tendency can be found with the expectation that the international community had for India to
influence the Sri Lankan Civil War (Prys 2010). As their neighbor, India was positioned as the
dominant country with the greatest degree of influence.
Realizing this, hegemons rely on the rising local actors to keep their regional interests a
priority by presenting it as a common goal. This was evident in the growing relationship between
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India and the United States, for the former to act as a barrier to Chinese expansion starting in the
1960s (Conclusion: The Past and Future of Rising Regional Powers 2016). A key motivator for
the United States was not a desire to cultivate a relationship with India as a growing country.
Rather hegemons have been creating alliances out of fear of losing resources due to a threatening
power. However, this does not mean that hegemons are neglecting the potential of these regional
rising powers. Instead, their relationship is dependent on the reality of the prominent threat of
another rising country. With Indian-US relations, if China slows in growth the US has less
incentive to help strengthen India. In contrast, if China continues their growth, the US will need
a partner within the region to prevent resource control.
As mentioned previously, a difficulty within political science is the overuse of terminology
with no understanding of the differences between the terms. This tendency is played out again
when understanding regional powers. Political scientists have applied global theories instead of
finding the proper tools to analyze, identify, and differentiate between various regional powers.
When looking towards international examples, the literature conflicts in how to define these
prevalent cases as either regional, intermediate or emerging middle powers. The main differences
between middle and regional powers rests on legitimacy, involvement with institutions, and
maintaining order (Nolte 2010).
Martin Wight believed that regional actors could be understood as middle powers. Unlike
hegemons, regional powers are not aiming to influence at the global level but rather within their
own backyard. These actors are focused on a limited region where they can operate on their
accord. While the terminology is different, the theory is supported by Detlef Nolte’s research
which identified four common traits of regional powers.
1. Geographically are a part of the region in question.
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2. These regional powers are able to stand up against any coalition of other states in the
region.
3. They are also highly influential in regional affairs.
4. States can also have power that extends to influence on the world scale.
Depending on the abilities of the state, they have two options for defending their power
against coalitions in the region. They can display superiority in terms of power capabilities, if
they have the largest power share in the region. If the country lacks material resources, they will
focus on influencing the region by taking on the responsibility to act as the “role model” and set
rules. Through other tactics, such as territorial denial, diplomacy, economic strengthening, and
signaling of resolve to participate in the balancing coalition, these rising powers can skew the
terms of cooperation in their favor. Nolte’s last trait is corroborated when analyzing how major
regional powers have also worked to strengthen their international relationships and alliances.
With turning the focus away from hegemonic powers came a general weakening of the
current system which gives these rising states a platform to reset the international structure to
their benefit. For these rising powers, this opportunity provides them a chance to challenge the
global order by demanding a status and benefits they did not previously enjoy. Nolte’s analysis
of this power structure included AFK Organski’s interpretation of this tendency, when he applied
the Power Transition Theory to regional powers. The dominant power defines and enforces the
rules within the international order to maximize net gains. However, regional powers should also
be recognized by their growing economic influence but also as system challengers out of
dissatisfaction of the current order (Nolte 2010). By creating new norms, these regional powers
also destabilize the system for the dominant power which further places these countries on the
radar.
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Much of international relations has centered around the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, led by the United States. However, our
understanding of the international sphere has changed as political scientists have recognized the
rise of developing countries within the Southern Hemisphere (Stephen). Specifically, between
the IBSA states (India, Brazil, and South Africa) the world has noticed their economic expansion
and the political implications of that growth. By focusing on their relationships, this trio has
begun restructuring the international field to insert their voice on global issues. This coordination
has also begun a “fight” against developed countries by countering efforts from the Northern
Hemisphere. As they gain in power, the IBSA states will seek to balance the dominance of the
established powers. Another example of this fight is the Asian Infrastructure Bank, which China
established to counter the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This
initiative lends legitimacy to Chinas international endeavors and extends their sphere of
influence while changing the rules of the game. This is a clear example of China actively seeking
to shape international institutions to assert its presence and influence at the global level.
i.

Economic Growth

Through extensive economic growth some countries such as India, China and Brazil are
being recognized on the global level and thus can demand greater influence within international
institutions and through relationships with other countries. Between the years of 1980 and 2004,
India managed to grow their economy without facing any recessions (Nayar 2006). By
implementing governmental macroeconomic policies, India experienced growth that drew
attention from the international community. Regardless of who is experiencing the growth,
economic ascension is a common sign of rising superiority.
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Due to colonialism, historically India focused on exporting raw materials and thus has placed
a wider emphasis on agriculture. Currently, in terms of its national GDP, agricultural importance
has decreased but 60 percent of the workforce are still engaged in the sector. This contrast is
supported by prevalent poverty rates which still fuel domestic insurgencies (Nayar,2006).
Prabhat Patnaik’s research into India’s growth demonstrates how some researchers are
skeptical about the relationship between India’s growth rate and persistence of poverty. Patnaik
explains how trusting GDP can be difficult as it does not include all transfers within the
economy, and thus cannot serve as a representative measure of growth (Patnaik,2011). Keeping
in mind the antithetical dynamic between economic growth and poverty rates in India,
economists have provided policy suggestions that will encourage economic growth to continue
the resulting political power. Without handling internal matters first, it is harder to gain
recognition by neighboring countries or the greater international community. This is an
important distinction because it demonstrates the significance of domestic stability in a countries
ability to have a prominent role in global policy making. While economic success does not
always translate to elimination of internal struggle, it is a factor that influences the latter. India’s
situation is a clear example of this relationship. Overall, the country is experiencing economic
growth, however the persistent poverty rates demonstrate that this growth is not experienced
equally throughout the state and is cause for political tension and eventual violence.
In contrast to India, Brazil experienced both economic growth and poverty reduction.
Between 1990 and 2012, Brazil has experienced a reduction of poverty rates from 48.8 percent to
28.1 percent. In addition, Brazil has underwent an increase in foreign domestic investment from
57.8 billion dollars to 157.6 billion between 2005 and 2013 (Sauer 2017). They have enjoyed
these benefits because of a heightened dependency on Brazilian primary products and raw
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materials. Given that Brazil’s economy constitutes half of the total economy within South
America, it is clear to label Brazil as a regional economic power. After their transition into a
representative democracy, Brazil can also be considered politically stable. This allows the
international community to have further confidence in their market and strengthen the argument
for Brazilian supremacy.
By its historic economic growth, Brazil has become a key player in expanding its influence.
It is able to formulate its regional agendas and initiatives that incorporates various countries.
Recognizing its position within Latin America, Brazil reoriented its economy from a market of
distancing, to a market of regional integration. Increasingly with newer administrations, Brazil
has shifted its agenda to coordinate regional cooperation and integration efforts with an eye
towards boosting development through political dialogue throughout various sectors. As
integration is a way of gaining access to foreign markets and strengthening the country’s
bargaining position, Brazil has developed and consolidated a process of regional integration
through initiatives such as the Common Market of the South, i.e. Mercosur (Saraiva,2010).
However, most of Brazil’s economic prosperity and diplomatic relations are associated with the
Silva administration beginning in 2003. Specifically, with their Africa policy, President Silva
increase integration and positive relations by reopening embassies and visiting African nations
(Seibert, 2011).
Discussions that are centered around growth and globalization would not be complete
without mentioning China. One international motivator is the focus on India was to counter
China’s obvious growth and extension of power within Asia. With a rapidly increasing
population size and a scarcity of natural resources, China has also experienced an increase in
external relations to supplement its growth. While China is seen as a major threat to American

13

hegemony, they are beginning their rise with a focus on regional affairs. China is seen as the
superior alternative with soft containment strategies against US constraint in the region (Ali,
2010).
ii.

International Relations
As the world continues to grow with international relationships, it is helpful to analyze

these relations to understand the type of regional power countries are. For India, their potential to
rise to global standing is dependent on their economic relation with China, as their largest trade
partner (Hall 2010). The two have mutual apprehension towards the growth of the other, but the
lasting economic benefits outweigh any fear.
For India to become a key player within their region and maintain prosperity within their
borders, India must maintain feasible relationships within their neighborhood. Hall wrote of the
four arcs which determines India’s diplomatic relations.
1. Arc of Prosperity: land east to India
2. Arc of Energy: land between the Persian Gulf and Russia
3. Arc of Instability: land west after Pakistan, and the land between Pakistan and
Bangladesh
4. Arc of Communications: recognizing the importance of the Indian Ocean as
the link between Europe and Asia.
The convergence of all four arcs creates a vortex where India sits in the middle and has the
ability to develop peace that maintains balance in the region. Past having influence on the global
field, India also meets the material trait found with other regional powers. India has built their
army to be the third largest in the world (Hall 2010). While a mainly peaceful nation, having the
ability to forcefully extend their power across Asia raises international interest.
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This analysis of the four arcs is relevant to the broader study, as it presents one example of
how a country can be classified as a regional power, and the overlapping factors that are
considered. It should be noted that the balance of arcs is also relevant in Ethiopia’s ability to
remain a powerful actor within East Africa. Ethiopia’s Arc of Prosperity and Energy refers to
land east of Ethiopia, and the Nile’s upstream countries. Past Ethiopia’s internal political
struggle, the two arcs are merged as the potential to control the Nile River with a hydroelectric
dam which will determine the fate of Ethiopia’s prosperity within the region. Correspondingly,
the Arc of Instability can focus on Ethiopia’s historical tension with Eritrea or neighboring
conflict in Somalia, and Sudan. Similar to India’s Arc of Communications, Ethiopia is
strategically located to serve as the middle point between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.
Both countries face the challenge of balancing and utilizing their regional arcs to establish
international success.
Historically, since the departure of the British, Indian and Pakistani conflict has been a
source of instability within Southeast Asia. It has driven countries away from the region, while
encouraging others, such as the US, to intervene for the sake of peace (Nayar). India has
motivation to encourage peace within the region, as it can incentivize foreign investors into their
markets, and allow for India to continue their rise into regional dominance.
In comparison to donations by the Western world, Indian monetary aid to Africa is more
easily seen as collaboration towards a common goal. These rising states are taking advantage of
working the current system to strengthen their relationship with other developing countries. By
reinforcing that all participants are equals, the countries are able to create a relationship guided
by respect and non-interference in domestic affairs. This is a direct counter to how Western aid is
viewed, and commonly implemented. With time, this eventually leads to a decline of the
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dominant actors in developing countries. However regardless of how aid is framed, most
countries are often motivated by self-interest for all parties involved.
A similar motivation has been adopted by the Chinese and coined as the Beijing Consensus.
The idea was first categorized to recognize China’s new power and position as a competitor to
the US. In contrast to Western values, this concept is supported by Confucian ideals of “living
peacefully with neighbors, bringing prosperity and providing safety” (Cho 2008). Chinese
diplomatic relations and thus economic aid is generally considered condition free after the
recipient country acknowledges the One China policy. For example, governmental differences
with African countries does not determine their relationship (The Rising Power of China 2015).
To achieve ‘peaceful development’ China has switched from American centered diplomacy, to
neighbor centered policies.
China’s dependency on global energy is a crucial aspect of determining their foreign policy.
There is now a growing importance for collaboration with states that provide natural resources,
but also states that can establish the safe movement of assets. There has been conflicting research
on labeling Chinese goals, due to the mix of Chinese globalism, unilateralism, diplomacy and
force. As a result, China has been recognized as a “regional power without a regional policy”. To
assist in this analysis political scientists in the past have assumed that China’s Asia-Pacific
policy is composed according to the rational actor model (Christofferson 1996). Past that general
starting point, analysts are unable to elaborate thoroughly the specific outlines of China’s
policies.
That being said, there is still a plethora of data demonstrating Chinese dominance and
engagement with the international sphere. Through aid, waiving international debt or building
infrastructure, the Chinse have created mutually beneficial relationships that contrast to many
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relationships their trading partners have had with hegemonic powers (Ali 2010). With their
growing economic interests in East Asia, there has been a rise in establishing and joining
multinational organizations. Through this, China has strengthened various diplomatic
relationships, and focused on strategic issues while demonstrating an influential voice in the
region (The Rising Power of China 2015).
Before delving into Africa, it is important to review the two-pronged approach when
discussing a states rise to claim regional power. First, the aforementioned states have
experienced economic growth which has been prompted by increasing growth rates and
diminishing poverty rates. Secondly, they are also increasing their political capital and power.
Beginning within their region, there is an increasing amount of expectation and influence to act
accordingly as the moral rule setter and enforcer. For the BRICS countries, their influence has
expanded past their backyards into the rest of the world beginning with Africa.
IV.

Within African Context
The purpose of the research paper is to interpret Ethiopia’s rise within the region and

compare the growth to other regional powers and theories. The rise of regionalism in Africa has
two perspectives, how it influences external actors within the continent and internal responses to
regionalism. This section of the literature review will tackle both aspects, by observing Brazilian,
Russian, Indian, and Chinese (BRIC) economic involvement in Africa and how some African
countries have adopted regionalism.
With the aforementioned economic growth within regional powers, some have also increased
their involvement within Africa with a focus on economic assistance. In contrast to donations by
the Western world, monetary aid to Africa is primarily introduced as collaboration towards a
common goal when it is clear that both parties benefit with the established relationship. These
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rising states are taking advantage of working the current system to strengthen their relationship
with other developing countries. By reinforcing that all participants are equals, it is easier to
contrast these relationships, which are guided by respect and non-interference, with those made
with the Western World. With time, this eventually leads to a decline of the dominant actors who
had been involved in developing countries.
For India, looking back to their historical development as a grand civilization, there is a
belief that India has an obligation to play a large role internationally (Cohen 2000). India has
focused on reintegrating various communities back into African markets, instead of forcing
African citizens to buy Indian products (Narlikar 2010). Through their economic assistance,
India has emphasized their core values of decolonization and commitment to Third Worldism.
Nonetheless, India is still participating in strategic behavior as their work in Africa provides
India greater legitimacy and prestige in international institutions.
Brazil’s history with the continent goes back as early to 1538 via the Portuguese involvement
in the Trans-Atlantic slave trade. While they did not partake in the scramble for Africa, Brazil
remained close with other Portuguese colonies on the continent. To defend Brazilian
involvement in Africa, the government has encouraged building solidarity by utilizing their
common colonial history. Similar to India, Brazil has claimed a moral, political and historical
obligation to their fellow colonized states. Through the passage of the 1986 South Atlantic Peace
and Cooperation Zone, formal relations were established in the Southern Hemisphere to promote
peace, security and cooperation (Seibert 2011).
As mentioned previously, regionalism in the form of alliance formation has made it possible
for such countries as Brazil, India and China to enter into Africa. However, regionalism has also
taken hold within the continent. Recently, there has been a movement to find African solutions
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for African problems. This change has been taken to the institutional level with calls from the
African Union for Pan-Africanism and integration within the continent. While these calls have
been with the goal of unifying the continent against external forces, it also encourages further
African regionalism. Most prominent examples include the African Union (AU), and its
acknowledged regional economic communities such as: Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of West African States (ECWAS), the
Southern African Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC), to list a
few. Generally speaking, regional organizations can be broken into five categories: the
aforementioned economic communities recognized by the AU, general economic, energy based,
river & lake, peace & security, and environmental organizations. Most countries are member
states of numerous organizations. For an example of a conservative number, Kenya is a member
of nine regional organizations while the Democratic Republic of Congo is involved in fourteen
(Byiers 2017). This overlap is explained by the fact that one organization does not provides all
the solutions. Membership in numerous communities allows countries to reap the benefits that
each organization offers. For example, COMESA provides Kenya protection from dumping
which strengthens their agricultural sector, which cannot be done under the EAC. However, this
lessens complete involvement or investment each country can have into one organization as their
membership and role is often stretched thin.
With this, has come a shift towards African regionalism as it is an attractive option for weak
states. Political and economic weakness justify the role of regionalism as it helps manages the
pressure from globalization. Regionalism provides an alternative to the states to retain their
autonomy but continue growth. Instead of facing the pressures of hegemonic powers, these states
now have the opportunity to turn towards a helpful neighbor.
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To understand state weakness, it is crucial to understand power. Robert Keohane defines a
weak state as those “..who can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact
on the system” (Taylor 2003). With this weakness comes the absence of loyalty and lack of
internal compliance to the state. This also encourages movements in one country to seep into the
next, thus creating regional issues. Keohane’s definition is only one attempt at defining state
weakness, but regardless of the criteria used African states are consistently considered to fit the
bill. In additional to political weakness, African countries tend to also have small economies.
Smaller markets are encouraged to participate in socio-economic integration, as independence
makes developed and diversified markets harder to achieve. Regionalism provides countries a
platform to access a larger market area. With this access, states can overcome fragmentation of
small markets and ensure access to technological advances.
Regionalism can be understood as a “series of bargains among the political leaders of the
major states in the region” (Taylor 2003). This collaboration eventually leads to the convergence
of interests among these states. While it aligns states in a region, it is done under the leadership
of one dominant state. That being said, while regionalism provides an opportunity for smaller
states to grow, it also allows for Western ideals to resume within Africa. The South African
Renaissance, which calls for economic integration through regionalism, essentially is calling for
the “promotion of Western political and economic values” (Gandois).
Gandois found that there are three different categories of regionalism within Africa:
1. Macro-Regions call for the coordination of transnational capital flow within a
geographical region. Examples include the EU, NAFTA, and the South African
Development Community. This category is the most abstract, which makes it harder to
create a sense of region.
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2. Sub-Regions are constructed upon historical and economic legacies. Initiatives from this
level are implemented more efficiently because they can integrate a wide range of states.
3. Micro-Regions are considered to be a subgroup within the previous category. These focus
more on historical legacies between countries that are geographically near one another.
Understanding these three levels is crucial as it allows political scientists to estimate how
citizens will respond to various initiatives and compare different strategies across the continent.
This research on Ethiopia will contribute to this conversation.
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Chapter One: Regionalism and Major Powers in Africa
I.

Introduction
Before focusing on Ethiopia and whether or not it can be considered East Africa’s

regional power, it is important to truly understand regional actors within the continent. This
chapter takes a more detailed approached to understanding regionalism than the preceding
general literature review. In this chapter, the actions and characteristics of Nigeria, Kenya, and
South Africa will be considered. The chapter also briefly discusses the landscape of regional
institutions on the continent. By focusing on the institutions, it will provide a framework for
understanding how major powers within the Horn of Africa operate. By analyzing how these
countries have acted in their backyard, and within regional institutions, the chapter provides
context for understanding Ethiopia’s actions and classification.
II.

Challenges towards African Regionalism
To understand the complexity of regional institutions within Africa, this section begins

by addressing common challenges facing the continent and regional institutions. Many African
countries face high poverty rates which limits government expenditures on welfare programs that
seek to improve the quality of life for citizens. States’ economic constraints provides another
level of pressure on regional institutions, as most countries lack the resources necessary to
contribute to regional bodies. States’ inability to fund regional bodies is exacerbated by their
involvement in numerous organizations (Byiers 2017). Together, these two factors coupled limit
the effectiveness of regional institutions from the onset as there is limited financial support for
their endeavors.
Another factor that contributes to weak regional institutions is the general distrust of
regional hegemons. Regional leaders have a difficult time convincing smaller countries to join
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collective movements when these countries fear being dominated and are worried about the
equitable distribution of resources. For example, southern African states are sometimes
distrustful of South Africa, as they believe it reached its current dominant status at the expense of
smaller neighboring countries. After fighting for independence, African states were not eager to
cede any autonomy to a regional organization. Following colonial rule, many countries continued
to suffer the consequences of colonial policies that divided communities along ideological and
linguistic lines and hindered the effectiveness of regional cooperation. For example, various
countries inherited different political ideologies, such as Kenya and Tanzania, which experienced
a divide between capitalism and socialism. There was a linguistic divide among the
Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone African states, with the inheritance of different
political institutions, and legal and educational systems (Eke 2017).
These obstacles are crucial to keep in mind when considering Ethiopia’s ability to
coordinate within the Horn of Africa. Success for regional powers rests to some extent on their
ability to establish relationships that address and overcome these complications.
III.

African Powers
Having noted the challenges faced by African countries, we can begin the analysis of

successful regional powers to understand the paths each country took or did not take on the road
to success. McNamee’s (2016) research touches on characteristics found in successful African
countries and focuses on three important factors that can determine success in their region.
(1) Domestic success within their borders
a. With regional success, countries can utilize their power to create an arena for
the diffusion of ideas and principles (Flemes 2009).
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b. In this chapter, domestic success will be operationalized by analyzing the
country’s poverty rates, peaceful transition of power, and violence within its
borders.
(2) Effective, inclusive and transparent institutions
(3) Convincing their neighbors that their agenda is not self-serving
a. As stated previously, this step is crucial due to many state’s hesitation towards
hegemonic powers and agendas that do not equally benefit them. This is
accomplished by formulating a political project that neighboring countries can
identify with (Flemes 2009).
Using these three characteristics, the remainder of this section will analyze major
contenders for influence within the African context: Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa along with
regional institutions. This section relates to the broader research question at hand because it will
help address the extent to which Ethiopia can identify with these actors. Previously in the
literature review, this project considered economic growth and international relations to
understand classification of regional powers in the global community. However, the remainder of
this paper will use McNamee’s (2016) classification as it provides the manifestation of the
aforementioned duo. Economic growth is considered under the umbrella term of domestic
success, which allows other points of growth or decay to be considered. By convincing their
neighbors the agenda is not self-serving, countries are addressing their international relations.
Effective, inclusive and transparent institutions is included in this analysis because it adds
a degree of legitimacy to the government from both internal parties and external viewers.
Through the proper implementation of these institutions, the country can also operate in the

24

international field with moral weight behind their actions and words, knowing with certainty that
it reflects the desires and attitudes of their citizens.
i.

Nigeria

Until 2016, Nigeria had the largest economy in Africa and as seen with other regional
powers, economic superiority has been a helpful factor for countries to successfully establish
power within their backyard. However, in this case economic power did not lead to success
within their borders as the country consistently faced crisis. To understand the complexity behind
Nigeria’s internal conflict, it is vital to understand Nigerian colonial history, and economic
dependence on oil.
Modern Nigeria originated as the British colonized and combined a diverse group of
independent and occasionally hostile ethnic groups into one country. Now characterized with
linguistic and cultural differences, Nigeria houses roughly 250 different ethnic groups and 70
nationalities (Rotberg 2007). However, tension within Nigeria is split between the
predominantly Muslim northern region, and the Christian south. The differences between the
regions were only exacerbated as the colonial administration did not spread western education to
“insulate the north from modernity” (Elkaim 2012). In comparison to the south, this choice
perpetuated ineffective administrative rule without the proper tools to govern. Different colonial
policies in the north and south exacerbated differences. Educational opportunities contributed to
economic growth in the south, while the north lagged behind. The tension continued well after
colonial rule and led to a general mistrust and concern over political dominance. Postindependence, ethnic ties were stronger than national identity contributing to political unrest
characterized by coups, secessionist movements, and civil war. While ethnic fractionalization is
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not inherently a negative trait, within Nigeria it is problematic as ethnic and religious identities
are more important than identifying as African or Nigerian (Elkaim 2012).
In terms of the Nigerian economy, commercial oil production began in 1956 and has been
of heightened economic importance since the 1970s (Mähler 2010). However, the importance
soon became over dependence as Nigeria decreased exporting other agricultural products and
had weak resource management. The latter is especially influential as Nigeria does not fairly
distribute the revenues collected from oil. The percentage of oil revenues refunded to the
producing regions was reduced from 50% to 20% by 1979, and by 1999, it dropped to 3%
(Mähler 2010). This inequitable distribution of wealth fueled resentment and distrust from the
Niger Delta to the central government. With a lack of transparency, it is difficult to locate where
the money is going as social infrastructure projects are not improving. Most Nigerians do not
have sufficient access to health care, drinking water or electricity and more than 80% of the
population lives on less than 2 dollars a day (Mähler 2010). Since oil is capital intensive and
there has been a decrease in exporting labor-intensive goods, Nigeria has also faced rising
unemployment rates.
As economic marginalization and poverty were evident along ethnic, religious and
geographical lines, Nigeria is more prone to acts of civil unrest in an attempt to gain control.
(McNamee 2016). The rise of Boko Haram has been called a “manifestation of the failure of
successive Nigerian governments to curb corruption, deliver public services, generate economic
opportunity, establish accountable security institutions and engage both the North and Southern
regions” (Elkaim 2012). With minimal respect for the rule of law, high levels of
fractionalization, and increasing conflict within the country, Boko Haram was able to take
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advantage of the deteriorating political climate and develop as a religious sect to answer a
legitimate security issue.
In terms of regional institutions, Nigerian commitment to economic integration goes back
to the early 1960s. Before a political union within the region, Nigeria believed that economic
integration beginning at the sub-regional level was crucial. A strong economic union would give
stability for potential sub-regional collective security action. This consistent desire for
integration is seen in Nigeria’s involvement in the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS).
The country’s desire to become the industrial heart of Africa was only plausible within a
west African integration network (Olatunde 1980). However, the possibility of Nigerian
economic domination raised suspicion from neighboring countries. As McNamee mentioned, it
is crucial for a country to have the ability to convince others that their agenda is not self-serving.
While Nigeria struggles to contain domestic tension, there has been success in managing
differences in the region between Anglophone and Francophone states, and in neighboring
countries such as Equatorial Guinea. The country’s security dedication to ECOWAS comes to no
surprise, as about 55 percent of the population in West Africa live in Nigeria (World Bank 2019).
By focusing on regional security, for the most part Nigeria has taken steps towards convincing
their neighbors, that any regional actions are not self-serving.
However, these shortcomings do not prevent Nigeria from claiming their right to
leadership and dominance within the continent due to their historical role, population and
military strength. When taking these factors into consideration, Nigeria can be classified as a
secondary regional power instead of a hegemon (Flemes 2009). They receive this classification
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due to their comparatively poor economic performance within the continent, weak democratic
consolidation, and minor role in global affairs.
ii.

Kenya

Kenya’s influence can be seen within East Africa as they have the region’s strongest
international trade and investment links. With that advantage, they also serve as hubs for various
economic sectors. Due to their geographical position, white settler industries concentrated in
Kenya which resulted in a larger market and a developed infrastructure. However, this did not
come without any consequences from their neighbors. Initially member states in the East African
Community (EAC) felt Kenya had an unfair advantage due to the economic stability that the
British left. Kenya’s economic state post-colonialism was more appealing to foreign investors,
which worried member states about the distribution of benefits. In addition, Kenya represented
the Africa that the rest of the world wanted to see, with typical “African” landscapes, open
minded people, and social harmony (McNamee 2019). With foreign support and importance
within East Africa, Kenya was central to the economic and security architecture within the
region. They were considered the remaining beacon of political stability in a sea of weak states
(Khadiagala 2009). In terms of economic performance, the EAC depends on Kenya to a large
extent. In comparison to other member states, Kenya has the largest and most dynamic economy.
Due to a better national infrastructure, and diversification of exports, Kenya is also able to
maximize on the benefits of intra-East African trade (Kimenyi 2016).
However, it is also important to note that Kenya’s international status and visibility in the
region is what made it an easy target for al-Shabaab. Before the groups rise, Kenya attempted to
pre-emptively strike but it ended poorly and resulted in al-Shabaab turning its focus towards
Kenya. Between January 2012 and April 2015, al-Shabaab launched attacks which resulted in
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more than 600 causalities (Watkins 2016). The primary target has been pipeline routes linked to
the Lamu Port-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET). Initially, the Ugandan
oil route was to pass through Kenya. However, with the rising instability, Uganda decided that
the route would pass through Tanzania instead.
Politically, Kenya’s mantle was soon removed after the 2007 elections as it wreaked
domestic havoc and led to widespread international criticism. Due to unusually high voter
turnout, lack of access to political centers, and questionable voting hours, there were widespread
recognitions that the election was flawed. The violence that followed the elections lifted the veil
on Kenya and the political instability that was hidden. The fierce government response to the
protests revealed the gradual democratic erosion facing social and political institutions, the
extent of privatization, and violent marginalization along ethnic lines (Khadiagala 2009). As
previously mentioned, many African countries did not want to cede autonomy to regional and
international institutions, which includes limiting international offers for assistance. External
bids to mediate violence faced a legacy of national pride which manifested in Kenya believing it
could use security forces to restore order and stop violence. The government adopted a mindset
that there was no crisis that warranted foreign mediators. However due to Kenya’s importance
within the region there was a consistent push for resolution as the violence impacted major
transport routes from Mombasa and created fuel shortages.
Historically, the violent response was not a major surprise considering that Kenya was
under repressive rule beginning after colonialism. The presidential position had centralized
power and controlled land allocations. Political officers were able to stay in power by utilizing
patronage and repression. This only heightened ethnic tensions and income disparities, as
officials pushed poorer ethnic groups off previously owned land (Klopp 2007).
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Kenya still has failed to recognize the importance of effective, inclusive, and transparent
institutions and success at home. With the 2007 election, Kenya managed to lose trust within the
region and the international community. This is important when considering Ethiopia’s
classification, as Kenya is a major contender for controlling the region as a hegemonic influence.
iii.

South Africa

Similar to how the other African case studies face division within their population, South
Africa faces notorious inequality and division along racial lines. Inequality continued well past
apartheid, but it can now be understood in a different light. Since there has been some societal
improvements, the total share of income earner in black households have been rising but not at a
rate where the gap is greatly lessened with their white counterparts (Nattrass 2001).
Discriminatory policies are not simply “black or white” but rather based on preconditions that
have a racial undertone. For example, an employer cannot refuse a candidate’s application based
purely on race, but rather educational background, previous work experience, or other factors
which are inextricably linked to race.
With South Africa’s apartheid regime, the country faced a different predicament than
most African states in consideration. Apartheid served as an example for how quickly and
intensely instability can spill past domestic borders and influence the international community.
During Apartheid regime, most regarded South Africa as a political pariah and adopted a
diplomacy of isolation (Flemes 2009). Feeling the constraints of their past, the African National
Congress-led government in South Africa did not want to mirror the former regime’s aggressive
policies of regional hegemony and begun by focusing on trade policies within the South African
Development Community (SADC). Soon the relative economic strength led South Africa to
become the SADC’s most important member (Saunders 2014).
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Careful not to be seen as a hegemon, Africa was at the center of South African’s foreign
policy. This can be seen through military intervention into Angola, Zaire, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Burundi (Flemes 2009). However, their dedication to the region was
questioned due to unilateral decisions. For example, when South Africa ignored the concerns of
other SADC members and signed a bilateral trade agreement with the EU (Saunders 2014).
The military approach slowly shifted into a moral approach to their international policies
as South Africa wanted to demonstrate how the country had grown since the apartheid regime.
South Africa was able to increase credibility as an advocate for multilateralism by following
their words with actions. Before the end of apartheid, South Africa had taken steps to destroy
their nuclear arsenal and joined organizations to control international nuclear trade, and by 1994
gained inclusion in the United Nations’ Register for Conventional Weapons.
Similar to the international community favoring Kenya, South Africa also benefited from
this attraction after the political transition in 1994. The country received political clout with
Nelson Mandela opening the country to foreign interest and investment. However, that was only
the beginning as South Africa’s second president, Thabo Mbeki adopted a more pan-Africanism
and intervention policy than Mandela. Mbeki wanted to transform the Organization of African
Unity, introduce continental measures to improve governance, and reduce western intervention
into the continent. By the end of his term, Mbeki successfully formed relationships throughout
the region but was not able to achieve many of the larger continental goals due to lack of external
resources or support (Saunders 2014).
South Africa’s third president, Jacob Zuma continued the pan-Africanism perspective but
had an international twist. By 2010, South Africa had officially joined BRICS by presenting the
country as the “gateway” into Africa (Saunders 2014). However, many political commentators
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did not understand how South Africa was selected to join BRICS, as their economy did not come
close to other countries. Their inclusion went to represent Africa as more than providing raw
materials to other emerging global markets. With South Africa, BRICS became a political club
representing the developing world to counterbalance western influence
As the only African country in BRICS and the EUs, top ten global strategic partners
(McNamee 2016) it is clear that South Africa is accepted by the Western world. However, this
acceptance does not extend as fully within the African continent. Neighboring countries believed
South Africa grew at the expense of others such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Swatini (Eke 2017).
As the only African country in BRICS, this highlighted tension within the continent as countries
became more critical of China’s intention in Africa, and Zuma’s relationship with China. Many
accepted South Africa’s growth but did not welcome their superiority and agenda.
Within the context of McNamee’s characterization of regional powers, South Africa
compares better to Nigeria and Kenya. However, it is clear that South Africa has not managed to
fully convince their neighbors their agenda is not self-serving. There is still a clear racial divide
within the country that raises questions on how successful domestic strategies have been in
equitably allocating economic resources. As mentioned before, South Africa presents an
interesting case for comparison as Ethiopia could learn from Cape Town’s shortcomings.
IV.

East African Regional Institutions
As mentioned earlier, after colonialism many countries were opposed to joining institutions

that would require ceding a certain degree of autonomy. However, the fear of losing sovereignty
did not prevent countries from acknowledging the benefits of collaborative organizations.
Understanding regional institutions is crucial as it provides context for whether African countries
face restriction or freedom when operating within their region.
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Post colonialism, in addition to the antagonism felt towards the outside world, there was a
general consensus to create a distinct African personality. This can be seen with the “African
solutions for African problems” mentality. With states struggling for legitimacy it was common
to resort to force for sustaining power. With this development, it decreased attention and
resources as they have not been focusing on sustainable state development and regional
institutions.
Within the East African context, political leaders have taken steps to incorporate regional
institutions. Initially heads of government joined to discuss regional organization; however, these
leaders realized how ineffective the meetings were. These meetings eventually became
consolidated by 1967 with the East Africa Order-in Council as the head of governments
continued to meet but with a single regional authority. Eventually, this led to the member states
wanting to declare a political federation for the region with a focus on equitable distribution.
These steps turned into the Treaty of East African Cooperation which established the EAC in
1967 (Ramolefe 1972) with Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda as the initial member states. This
community was short lived due to limited economic and political unity. This is a common issue
as various organizations operated with a top to bottom routine instead of focusing on subregional integration first (Masinde 2017). Instead, there should be an effort to focus on structural
economic transformation at the regional level to increase overall productivity.
With no durable political framework there was no mechanism to address corruption with
a general disrespect for rule of law within the member-states and community. The EAC was reestablished in November 1993 as Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania signed once more to consolidate
cooperation (Bar 2018). By 2007, Rwanda and Burundi joined, with the Republic of South
Sudan being the newest member in 2016. The admittance of South Sudan provided the EAC an
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opportunity to prove the effectiveness of the community. Many believe their entry into the EAC
would help South Sudan resolve their problems by following the example of Rwanda towards
political stabilization and decreasing poverty rates.
This hope was further encouraged as the EAC became the key driver for regional
integration within East Africa. With more than 143.5 million people, a combined GDP of $11.0
billion the Community established a customs union and a common market. In comparison to the
EACs predecessor, this version was more institutionalized and aimed for deeper integration.
However, this does not mean that the EAC was free of challenges. There was still tension in truly
restoring and maintaining stability, with growing terrorism and security threats throughout the
region.
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Chapter 2: Analyzing Ethiopia’s Potential as Regional Power
I.

Introduction
Before analyzing where Ethiopia currently lies in the geopolitical ladder within East

Africa, it is crucial to have an understanding of the country's modern history and previous rulers.
The objective of this chapter is to provide context for understanding various political situations
that Ethiopia must solve to be considered a regional power as explained in the previous chapter.
The first section will range between the 1800s-1970s, while the next section will provide context
for the military regime and revolution that led to the modern federalist state. The following
chapter will consider the three conditions proposed by McNamee for defining and understanding
regional powers. Some analysis into Ethiopia groups the country with others in Northern Africa,
however this chapter will continue to consider Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa, and relationships
with neighboring countries such as Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia.
State modernity is a common dilemma considered throughout various monarchs and
political administrations. In this chapter, modernity will be understood as attempts to build the
nation state, industrialization, urbanization, bureaucracy, and mass literacy.

II.

State Building Emperors 1800-1970s
i.

Emperor Tewodros II - 1855-1868

Ethiopia in the 1800s is understood under the definition of Zemene Mesafint, or the “Era
of the Lords”. In this context, the Lords were referring to the Sheh rulers who had established a
dynasty with kings throughout the region. The system functioned with the idea of puppet kings
serving one Ras, or central chief. However, this was seen as a time of disorder and chaos with no
strong central authority (Prunier 2015). This lack of centrality explains the rise and reign of the

35

first Emperor who was soon labeled the modernizer of Ethiopia having learned from Zemene
Mesafint. Due to the lack of central authority with the Lord system, Emperor Tewodros II’s rise
was characterized by successful rebellions. During his reign, Ethiopia witnessed the first step
attempt to stop slave trade, and the establishment a well-developed literary Amharic system
(Zewde 2001). His military success which led to his appointment as “King of All Kings”
continued during his reign to begin the process of Ethiopian state expansion. While he was the
first step towards modernization, that did not stop both internal and external influences that
eventually led to his decline. Internal tension between competing regions for the crown, and
coups for his reign led to frustration that led to extreme actions which eventually led the Emperor
to lose control. The last half of his reign was characterized with continuous rebellion with no
peace or order, however his successors kept building on the process of national revival. This
would become a trend that continues into the 21st century.
ii.

Emperor Yohannes 1871-1889

The next prominent Emperor was Yohannes who served between the years of 1871 to
1889. Continuing the trend of modernization, Emperor Yohannes continued geographical
expansion into the western, southern, and south-eastern direction (Prunier 2015). In terms of
organizing the government, Yohannes established loose states within the border with the
Emperor at the top. While not an example of a true modern state during this time era, Emperor
Yohannes took modernization a step farther, for eventually Emperor Menelik II to complete the
modernization process. However, under this reign, Ethiopia faced more external pressure than
before. Neighboring countries, such as Sudan, Egypt and Kenya were being colonized by the
British, as an effort to show Ethiopia how easily the British could invade. Encroachment into
Ethiopia was deemed justifiable to attempt eradicating slavery, which Emperor Tewodros II was
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not able to successfully accomplish. However, the British deemed Egypt to be a more viable
economic partner instead of Ethiopia or Sudan. In 1882, the British through Egypt, were
concerned with any potential control Ethiopia could enforce over the Nile and thus AngloEgyptian resources (Zewde 2001). Their influence in Northern Africa eventually led to a full
aggression strategy to control more land and natural resources. Soon, with Italy, the two
European powers began consolidating resources and support for one another to watch Ethiopia
and the Blue Nile. On the eastern border, Emperor Yohannes dealt with growing Italian influence
on the Red Sea, which would eventually culminate into an invasion with the next regime. Italian
military incursion began with the Battle of Massawa which opened the interior of Ethiopia and
served as the precursor for the notorious Battle of Adwa in 1896.
iii.

Emperor Menelik II 1889-1913

Emperor Menelik II was gaining political support while Yohannes was still in power. The
end of Emperor Yohannes reign was characterized by internal conflict because while he was
considered Emperor, respect and awe was given to Menelik II. His supremacy in the ranks is
explained by Menelik II’s military experience and supremacy as he was able to win the southern
and western regions of Ethiopia, which provided additional economic resources or rent to
Emperor Yohannes. Due to his political and military might, after Yohannes’ death, it made sense
for Menelik II to serve as the next Emperor. For the most part, the various regions and rulers had
no contention over Yohannes’ successor, except the Tigray region. As Emperor Yohannes was a
Tigrayan native, their frustration over the crown leaving their region would come back to fuel
Tigrayan dissent against the Ethiopian state.
However, it is fair to say that the respect was properly placed as it was Emperor Menelik
II who was able to complete the modernization process that began with Emperor Tewodros II
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almost 60 years prior. While Ethiopia reached the modern shape under Menelik II, it was not
done without any tension as he incorporated an ethnic dimension to conquering land. As a leader
from the Amhara region, the majority of conquerors were Amhara and there was a clear divide
between the oppressed and oppressors across ethnic lines. In response, the Oromo elite, as the
major ethnic group in Ethiopia, did not see the reason for subjection. With expansion, brought
more land and possible sources for revenue to the imperial government. To control and ensure a
steady flow of birr, Ethiopia’s currency, Emperor Menelik II utilized the Gabbar system, which
some describe as almost worse than slavery (Zewde 2001). Gabbar fits into a broader feudalcolonial system that previous Emperors utilized, with the imperial government at the center
requiring rent from their land. Gabbar is specifically referring to the status that a majority of
peasants were reduced to. In this condition, individuals were forced to render services to
government officials, and provide housing or resources (Gnamo 2014) This system varied across
different regions as it was up to the leaders, but since they did not receive any form of official
payment, any money was from the peasants working the land. Not only is land a source of
contention for many in Ethiopia, it is a recurring theme that has led to the downfall of many
historical regimes.
In terms of infrastructure, modernization was crucial for Ethiopia to keep its
independence and minimize the ability of European powers to convince Ethiopians about the
benefits of colonial influence. However, it is important to note that without a colonizing power to
bring European modernization, structurally, Ethiopia was different in comparison to their
African neighbors. Towards the last years of Menelik II, through European involvement, they
introduced a trainway system, a banking system, and pushed for educational reform which would
later come back to support a revolutionary movement (Prunier 2015).
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Emperor Menelik II is most notably known for leading Ethiopia to victory in the Battle of
Adwa against the Italians in 1896. Italian influence had seeped into Ethiopia shortly after Kifu
Qen, or the Great Famine of 1888-1892. The famine greatly influenced the Northern regions of
Ethiopia, which provided the Italians a way in to find allies in their pending invasion (Kaplan
1990). While tension with Italy was not a new concept, the tension was forced after the signing
of the Wuchale Treaty of 1889 between the two countries. Emperor Menelik II made it clear that
Eritrea was not a part of Ethiopia and drew lines with Italy for clarification over Italian influence
in the region. However, this treaty soon became known as an incident as there were two versions
of the treaty, one in Amharic and one in Italian. Not knowing, the latter gave more power to the
Italians and their scope of influence to include Ethiopia. Once Emperor Menelik II was made
aware, he rejected the entire treaty which eventually led to a full invasion by the Italians under
General Oreste Baratieri (Reckonings 2011). Due to poor planning on the Italian side and sheer
numerical superiority under Emperor Menelik II, he was able to lead the country to victory.
This battle was particularly significant because it raised Ethiopia’s status in the
international world and became a beacon for independence and dignity surrounded by colonized
countries. Shortly after the decisive win, the Italians signed the Treaty of Addis Ababa which
recognized Ethiopia as an independent state. Within Ethiopia, the national pride of winning the
war provided a brief movement of unity and an attitude against any further foreign incursion. It
was a point of national unity that even today, some cite the Battle of Adwa as an explanation for
current pride found in many Ethiopians.
Throughout the Ethiopian emperors during this era and beyond, rulers struggled to
establish a nationalism that could surpass any ethnic or religious identity for a prolonged period
of time. During Emperor Yohannes’ time, the poor central government added to the difficulty as
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there was nothing to identify with besides regional rulers. By the 1890s, the central state was
much more prominent that a national identity was feasible. However, many monarchs and rulers
had strong religious and ethnic traits that were specific to the Shoans from the Zemene Mesafint
era. In response, the next Emperor understood the importance of establishing a modern and
secular national identity for the survival of the Ethiopian state as a unitary force. It was only with
Ras Tafari Mekonnen, who would take on the title of Emperor Haile Selassie did Ethiopia enter
the 20th century, as Emperor Menelik II’s successor lost power soon after his enthronement.
iv.

Emperor Haile Selassie 1930-1974

Emperor Haile Selassie might be the most well-known Ethiopian emperor, after Menelik
II. There are various factors that led to his international acknowledgement, but many historians
note Selassie’s absolutism that Ethiopia had never seen before.
Internally, Emperor Selassie had clear intentions to increase the power of the monarch
and guarantee economic privilege of the nobility. This is evident in the 1931 proposed
Constitution, only one year after his enthronement. This constitution served as a framework for
absolutism and executive aggrandizement, with the intention of presenting the Constitution to
any foreign out lookers (Zewde 2001). The inclusion of the latter explains any civil liberties
given to the people on paper, when de facto treatment was the opposite. Past the difference in
theory and practice, this Constitution lacked legitimacy because Selassie believed the people
were not ready for involvement, limited any overview of the Constitution and thus enforced it
from the top down. Through various methods of coercion, the central government continued to
deny democratic rights past the signing of the Constitution. Due to Selassie’s short-term
thinking, this was a quick solution to maintain power, but it also gave no room for organic
expression or formation of civil societies which inflamed opposition to the regime.
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While Menelik II experienced military victory against the Italians, a part of Emperor
Selassie’s regime was characterized by Italian occupation between 1936 and 1941 with the
Emperor abroad for that time frame. This was encouraged with British support, as both countries
understood Ethiopia to be in Italy’s economic zone, as long as the British could build on Lake
Tana (Zewde 2001). This invasion was more successful than the Battle of Adwa for a number of
reasons: Selassie’s absolutist structure weakened any form of unity Ethiopians felt towards one
another which led some regional powers to side with and help Italy, and those in political power
were civil administrators and not military leaders. Due to the embarrassment felt on the Italian
side, this second invasion was more effective on their end while the Ethiopians were not actively
prepared; in other words when compared to the Battle of Adwa, the two countries switched roles.
That being said, this occupation is also considered a glorious chapter in Ethiopian history
because there was a readiness to die for liberty and independence against the Italians (Zewde
2001). Nationwide there were military actions against the occupation, however it was World War
II which encouraged European parties to help push Italy out in 1941.
With the departure of Italian occupants, Emperor Haile Selassie returned from exile in
London and resumed his absolutist agenda. From the beginning of his regime, Selassie was
against the feudal land system and began the political culture of privatization of land. Especially
with the rising cost, to broaden his support base Selassie provided grants for those who served in
the war. However, since the government was also trying to increase revenue there was additional
pressure on the peasantry class thus continuing the actions of previous administrators. Similar to
Menelik II in 1882, Emperor Selassie’s land arrangement made land easy prey for famine which
eventually uncovered the regimes irresponsibility, which was a factor that led to the fall of
Ethiopia’s longest reigning Emperor.
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There was an attempted coup in 1960 due to political oppression but due to poor
organization, it was not successful. However, instead of responding to the structural issues that
led to the coup, Selassie rewarded those who stayed loyal. In regards to peasant rebellions, it was
highly emphasized in the Tigray region which demonstrated the intensity of emotions felt against
the regime. As mentioned before under Menelik II, there was a push to reform the education
system. In response, it was the students that empowered the revolution against Emperor Haile
Selassie. Not only were they resilient but they were dispersed across various locations and
educational levels. However, due to Ethiopia’s political history there was not much democratic
foundation for the students to learn from and responded to intolerance in a variety of ways.
III.

Derg Regime 1984-1991
The revolution that led to the authoritarian regime of the Derg, is often described as a

“massive change.. [one] that turned the world upside down” (Zewde 2001). Recognizing the
recurring issue of landlordism, the Derg regime proposed radical land reform that led to their
base of support. Broadly speaking, the absolutist government structure of Emperor Selassie led
those low on the social ladder to rise against the high and mighty. The concept of military
intervention was not a new concept for Ethiopians to understand to struggle with the Derg
regime, and Mengistu Hailemariam as their leader. Due to authoritarian traditions that are woven
into Ethiopia’s past political leaders, it created a conducive environment to accept a “strongman”
such as Hailemariam. By utilizing his military power and skill, he formed close relationships
with the communist bloc, including countries such as Cuba, Yemen and Moscow. As a result of
the revolution, Ethiopia went from one extreme to another. In other words, Ethiopia traded in
Emperor Selassie for a military regime with Marxist doctrine deeply ingrained into their political
philosophy. While this era is colloquially known as the Derg regime, with the “election” of
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Hailemariam, the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) officially assumed state
power.
However, soon after, through force and subterfuge, the PDRE acted as the guardians of
the revolution that tore down an unequal imperial system. Once in power, the Derg’s land reform
focused around the nationalization of financial institutions and transferring resources into the
hands of the government. Between the years of 1974 to 1987, Ethiopia was characterized with
brutality and chaos that was coined Key Shibir or Red Terror to explain the actions of the regime
(McGhee 2013). To consolidate power, Hailemariam and his allies arrested and killed opposing
voices or anyone that seemed to oppose their slogan, Ityopia Teqdem or Ethiopia First. Since
much of the hostility came from regional forces, under Hailemariam Ethiopia experienced
politicization of ethnicity which would continue to influence the next political regime. In regards
to the Eritrean question, the Derg adopted a policy of a unitary-multiethnic state by unifying the
two countries and claiming all nationalities had the right to self-determination. This policy would
also come back during the 1990s under Meles Zenawi and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF). While there was debate within Ethiopia on how to accomplish this
goal, there was a sense of unity amongst Eritrean political parties against the Derg. There were
slight differences in ideology, but eventually the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF)
gained the most domestic support and represented the anti-Derg sentiment within Eritrea. Their
Ethiopian counterpart or support came from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). As
mentioned before, the Tigray political elite had felt a sense of marginalization since the crown
left their region with Emperor Menelik II. This was emphasized by past economic hardships due
to the worsening famine and economic crisis in 1984. Similar to Emperor Menelik II and Haile
Selassie, the famine revealed the lack of government proactive initiatives and how overstretched

43

resources were. The dynamic combination of the TPLF and EPLF would support the revolution
that ousted the military junta. Throughout the last half of the 1980s, the two parties had various
military victories in their respective countries which culminated in both parties conquering Addis
Ababa and Asmara in 1991.
However, to gain wide political support and legitimacy the TPLF recognized the
importance of a national agenda which eventually led to the establishment of the EPRDF with
the coalition representing the three main regions: the Tigrayans under the TPLF, the Amharas
with Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement and Oromiyaa with Oromo Democratic Party.
IV.

EPRDF 1988-2019
i.

Background

At this point in Ethiopia’s history, it is important to note recurring themes that have
continued to weaken the state and lower the legitimacy of the government. Through Emperor
Tewodros II, Yohannes, Menelik II and Haile Selassie, Ethiopia experienced various attempts of
modernization and establishing a national identity that surpasses any ethnic loyalty. However,
while the fall of each Emperor and the Derg portrays the importance of land allocation,
resources, natural disasters, and the ultimate consequence of centralizing political power. By
understanding Ethiopia’s placement in a regional conflict complex (Van Veen 2016), it helps
explain why there has been a theme of centralizing political power and keeping coalitions under
control. In response, Ethiopia has often had self-appointment rulers who do not deliver on
promises.
As mentioned earlier, the EPRDF came into existence to counter Hailemariam and the
Key Shibir he led through Ethiopia. To counter the military junta, the party had strong central
leadership and emphasized the importance of unity and cohesion among the Tigray people.
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While the party was a coalition of the four major regions, it was dominated by the TPLF. This
domination will become problematic to explain further dissent and political decisions for the
formation of the 1995 Constitution. Similar to the military supremacy under the Derg Regime,
once in power the TPLF continued to use military force to consolidate power. This soon became
a source of dissent as the party continued to use the same force that brought them into power.
Some historians have found more similarities than differences between Hailemariam and the
EPRDF first President Meles Senawi. The greatest difference was the former’s alliance with the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the latter’s Leninist ideology and partnership
with the Western world.
Given the Cold War threat with the USSR rising influence, the EPRDF required the
assistance of the United States and allies to consolidate their position. At this time Ethiopia, a
mainly Christian country, also represented an opportunity to counter Islamic fundamentalism that
was growing in the Horn of Africa. Looking back, historians have noticed the shortcomings of
Western influence during Ethiopia’s transitory period and not encouraging the inclusion of
opposition parties (Berhe 2001). While the EPRDF’s reign of terror cannot be equalized to Key
Shibir, it represented more continuity than dissimilarity in a party that claimed to represent the
reform Ethiopia desperately needed.
ii.

Ethnic Federalism

Post 1991, government officials claimed they found the way to achieve ethnic and
regional autonomy, while maintaining the state as the primary political unit. After World War II,
ethnicism was associated with backwardness as it was seen as an obstacle to state building, while
the nation state was worn with a badge of modernity. This was especially challenging for
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Ethiopia as the country has struggled since Emperor Tewodros II to establish a national identity
and unitary state.
In 1991, soon after the EPRDF assumed state power the Transitional Government of
Ethiopia held a conference with 27 groups participating to establish a charter for the future of
Ethiopia (Habtu 2003). At this conference, the groups acknowledged the need to end all
hostilities, health ethnic wounds and create peace and stability. Some political parties, such as
the Oromo Liberation Party (OLP) left the conference which helped the TPLF consolidate more
power. Since many of the movements that fought against the Derg were ethnically based, Zenawi
continued the thought to express political aspirations along ethnic lines and established nine
regional states on the basis of the dominant ethnic group (Habtu 2003).
While Menelik II was known as the Emperor that brought modernization into Ethiopia,
Meles Zenawi is known as the father of ethnic federalism which was consolidated in the 1995
Constitution. In response to the politicization of ethnicity done by Hailemariam, Zenawi felt the
need to acknowledge the diversity within Ethiopia before it led to further conflict. While ethnic
federalism is not a new concept within international affairs, Ethiopia was a unique case as the
Constitution granted nationalities the right of self-determination up to secession. The founders
believed this was the only solution to solving Ethiopia’s main problem of ethnicity and political
unity, by enhancing the political participation of the entire population and giving a voice to
previously oppressed people. Similar to the 1931 Constitution from Emperor Haile Selassie, this
document was merely words on paper as the EPRDF’s actions and constitution did not align. A
deep analysis into the party system showed that the EPRDF coalition controls all the regional
states in the federation through member parties. Instead of regional leaders being held
accountable to their electorate, they turned towards the party hierarchy located within the
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EPRDF (Aalen 2002). In other words, the regional governments cannot act independently from
the federal government since the federation system was being reinforced from the top bottom.
Since there was little meaningful public participatory debate, like in 1931, the EPRDF lost any
legitimacy they gained by excluding the opposition from refining the federal pack (Aalen 2002).
In response, ethnic federalism was seen as an EPRDF experiment, instead of a project from and
for the Ethiopian people.
Ethnic federalism, with the right of secession, can be seen as an ideal plan in theory, but
practically its heightened polarization between ethnic groups. The EPRDF idea was that this
would encourage more ethnic/regionally based political parties to join their coalition to further
legitimize their power. Instead, Zenawi opened up a pandora box within Ethiopia with many
groups demanding their version of self-determination or secession. Firstly, this was a practical
issue due to decades of interdependence (voluntary or not) between the regions which minimized
the governments likelihood to take demands seriously. Under the EPRDF, self-determination
was repressed which eventually led to confrontations and informal fragmentation that weakened
the political structure.
Secondly, this worsened the ethnic question in Ethiopia because it became easy to
politicize tension into an “us vs. them” mentality. Ethnic identity and thus differences were
emphasized with transactions with the government offices that required citizens to state their
ethnic affiliation. This was problematic for individuals who came from two different groups and
those who wished to identify as Ethiopian. The EPRDF hoped to represent unity but this
tendency contributed to the fear of state instability (Habtu 2003). As mentioned before, land and
natural resources has been a recurring point of contention in Ethiopian history. Conflict over
scarce economic resources consolidated ethnic alliances, group formation and thus power
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relation (Berhe 2001). If properly implemented, ethnic federalism could have solved the ethnic
question that has plagued Ethiopia’s history. However, the culture of consolidating power, and
suppressing opposition undermined the regions and thus limited any potential Ethiopia had to
fully democratize.
iii.

Eritrea

Following the question of ethnicity and national identity, the next consistent question was
Eritrea. As mentioned, the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea was initially drawn under
Emperor Menelik II and the Wuchale Treaty with the Italians. While that treaty initially led to
the Battle of Adwa, it represented the first legitimate step towards distinguishing between the
two countries and peoples. While the influence of Eritrea in Ethiopian politics has been a
consistent factor, the alliance between the TPLF and EPLF during the end of the Derg regime
brought Eritrea back into the political consideration of Ethiopia. However, this partnership was
not without tension as the two parties soon realized their ideological and military differences.
Since Eritrea reflected a more diverse population than the Tigray region under the TPLF, the
EPLF advocated for a clear, and distinct nationalist plan with an independent Eritrea. In contrast,
as seen with the transition into the EPRDF, the TPLF put their nationalist agenda on pause to
achieve greater political power (Plaut 1999). This tension was further exacerbated when the
TPLF proposed self-determination, up to the point of secession. The debate around ethnic
federalism included the question and their right for independence. The EPRDF agenda did not
align with Eritrea’s desire for a unified multi-ethnic state, that was not compatible with
secession.
However, generally speaking between the years of 1991 and 1997, the two countries
lived peacefully together. The end of 1997 was characterized by growing tension between the
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two countries that eventually led to military action. First, Ethiopia decided to import oil instead
of using the Assab refinery located in Eritrea. While not reactionary, shortly after, Eritrea
proposed their own currency (Nakfa) and requested it be used equally with birr which was
denied by Ethiopia. Border contentions had always been a source of conflict but had been
managed to get pushed off until 1998 when both countries claimed Badme as a part of their
territory. The conflict began with Eritrea taking the town by force and Ethiopia condemning
Eritrean aggression and demanded withdrawal. Ethiopia’s claim towards protecting their own
sovereignty eventually led to a prolonged war with mass casualties on both sides. This was only
worsened with rising distrust between the two leaders: Zenawi and Eritrean President Isaias
Afwerki.
The war eventually ended in June of 2000 with an agreement to cease hostilities between
the two governments, and Ethiopia expelling all Eritrean military troops. The Algiers Peace
Accord in December 2000 established a border commission to solve the contested territories that
sparked the war in the first place (Mesfin 2012). At the beginning, both sides agreed to accept
the results from the impartial commission and would consider them to be binding. However, in
2003, the commission granted the town of Badme to Eritrea which Ethiopia rejected.
While Ethiopia technically won the war, there was a post war policy of containment
which only formally ended in 2018 under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. This led to a relationship
characterized with tension, and empowering opposition forces in the other country. Due to the
structure of the Eritrean government under President Afwerki managed to weaken and isolate
Eritrea. With a weak underdeveloped bureaucratic infrastructure, concentration of power in the
executive office, and a small circle of political allies, Afwerki presented no real threat to the
Ethiopian government.
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V.

Conclusion
By considering rulers from Emperor Tewodros II to the establishment of the EPRDF,

there were common issues that each administration has attempted to address. Starting with the
concept of modernization, Emperor Tewodros II first tackled the issue by establishing a welldeveloped literary Amharic system. The desire to create a modern nation state was continued
throughout the following rulers through geographical expansion and legitimizing the central
state. This entire process culminated with Emperor Menelik, as Ethiopia’s borders finalized to
what it is today. Throughout history, Ethiopia experienced moments of national pride, as seen
after the Battle of Adwa, during Italian occupation, and the Revolution against the Derg military
regime. However, rulers struggled to establish a consistent national identity that surpassed ethnic
loyalties. In an attempt to answer the national identity question, leaders expanded the powers of
the central state which inevitably led to their downfall.
As mentioned throughout this chapter, another consistent problem has been power
struggles over natural resources. Due to Ethiopia’s long history with feudal systems, land had
been the core at determining socio-economic conditions for individuals, as well as a source of
inequality that fell along ethnic lines. For both Emperor Menelik I, Haile Selassie, and the Derg
Regime, famines have exposed poor land reform and infrastructure to help fight off the
consequences of famines.
As Ethiopia is landlocked, since it’s early foundation the country has had to deal with the
influence and incursions of their neighbors. While Eritrea presents an interesting case for
analysis, to understand Ethiopia’s role in the region the next chapter will analyze other
relationships. It will focus on Sudan, Egypt, and briefly Somalia to see how Ethiopia stands up to
McNamee's 2016 classification of a regional power.
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Conclusion: Ethiopia’s Classification
I.

Introduction
This final chapter will consider whether or not Ethiopia can properly accept the title of a

regional power, as defined by McNamee’s (2016) qualifications: (i) domestic success within
their borders, (ii) effective, inclusive and transparent institutions, (iii) convincing their neighbors
that their agenda is not self-serving. As international affairs are a highly intersectional topic, this
chapter will adopt a similar approach when considering Ethiopia’s qualifications. The first and
second factor will be combined under the umbrella of ethnic federalism, while the third will be
touched on in regards to Ethiopia’s relationship with Somalia and other Nile Basin countries.

Ethiopia:

Domestic Success

Institutions

Regional Agenda

Has Ethiopia
successfully achieved
this criteria?

To be determined

Yes, but more work
could be done

Complicating facts

Ethnic tensions and
violence against
specific groups of
individuals

In the past no but
there is reason to be
hopeful for the 2021
elections
Current PM has
delayed elections due
to COVID-19
concerns.

Effects of the GERD
project is yet to be
seen or actualized

The remainder of this chapter will go into detail as to why Ethiopia’s received these
classifications followed the aforementioned qualifications.
II.

Domestic Success
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Ethiopia’s rulers have been trying to answer the

national question, or in other words have been trying to establish a national identity that
surpasses any ethnic identification. There is contention that reaches as far back to the
fundamental question of when Ethiopia was established. For example, some believe that

51

Ethiopia’s origin dates back to biblical times, while the Oromo Liberation Front believe the
country was formed during the 19th century at the height of the Abyssinian colonial movement.
Ranging from Emperor Tewodros II to General Mengistu Haile Mariam, no ruler was
able to accomplish this feat. By the time Haile Mariam entered office, ethnic relations took a turn
for the worst. During the Red Terror, the regime responded harshly to any political dissent that
fell along ethno-regional lines. To fragment any opposition, the regime fostered conflict by
manipulating ethnic relations while denying alternative groups the ability to develop alterative
visions for Ethiopia’s future (Mengisteab 2001).
With ethnic identity heighted in response to the Derg’s policy, the EPRDF continued the
trend that began with their predecessor. When they came into power, the country was on the
verge of disintegration and the EPRDF offered ethnic federalism as the system to fix Ethiopia.
To them, this would solve the national question as creating a unified Ethiopia while maintaining
the diversity that Ethiopia enjoyed, and exploited. Leaders believed this system would promote
diversity by devolving political power to local communities and would serve as a method to
manage differences and establish a way for groups to participate and influence policy making
decisions (Mengistu 2015). The 1995 Constitution established 10 regional states and two federal
cities: Afar, Amhara, Benishangual-Gumuz, Gambela, Harari, Oromia, Somalia, Southern
Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region, Tigray, Sidama with Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa
as the two chartered cities. Following other federalist constitutions, this coalition party
encouraged self-determination, but unlike their counterparts, the EPRDF allowed the regional
groups rights up to the point of secession. A federalist system was logical for Ethiopia, as it is a
popular choice for overcoming conflict in diverse countries as it devolves power and resources.
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However, the system of ethnic federalism soon failed to answer to Ethiopia’s conflicts.
Historians reflect on the legacy of the EPRDF as a continuation of the Derg Regime minus the
obvious violence, as the former continued to operate as a unitary state despite the federal
administration system. Instead of opening the political arena to different regional parties and
leaders, the federalist system created a permanent cleavage that only led to further exclusion
(Mengistu 2015). As firm lines were drawn between the regions, it did not allow for free
movement between the regions which eased the development of “us” versus “them” sentiment.
Broadly speaking, ethnic federalism does not always necessarily increase ethnic violence, but
rather issues were conveyed through an ethnic lens with the “territorialization of ethnicity”
because it became the primary means of political mobilization (Aalen). By redrawing
administrative boundaries, it flamed problems that did not exist before in regions where
inhabitants lived peacefully and created problems for pastoralists who used to move freely
between regions.
Some historians cite the failings of ethnic federalism to TPLF’s hidden mission of
weakening Amhara hegemony through their “divide and rule” plan. As the Tigrayans were a
minority this constitution allowed the party to restructure the system in favor of the elite. The
tension between the Tigray and Amhara region cites back to the crown leaving the former under
Emperor Yohannes. However, the tension towards the Amhara leadership was not specific to the
Tigrayans, as the TPLF was able to utilize feelings of hostility towards Amharas to mobilize
other groups who had felt discriminated against.
Marina Ottaway wrote that “embarking on [the ethnic] path is bound to lead either to
increased repression or to mounting ethnic conflict and eventual disintegration of the country”
(Mengisteub). Similar to other commentators, they believed that Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism is

53

not compatible with democracy as a country cannot pursue ethnicization and promote democracy
at the same time.
Conditions were worsened as the federal arrangement the EPRDF had produced did not
actually give the regions the autonomy promised in the constitution, but ethnicity still served as a
mobilizing force within the country. As a result, Ethiopia was in a worse situation as they did not
reap the possible benefits of ethnic federalism and only faced the consequences of the system.
Theoretically, ethnic federalism could have worked in Ethiopia, however success was deterred as
power remained at the hand of a single, minority but still dominant party. With a de-facto one
party system under the EPRDF, the political arena was narrowed which decreased Ethiopia’s
ability to manage conflicts as seen through elections ranging from 1992 to 2010.
While clashes between ethnic groups is not news to Ethiopia, due to rising popularity and
the intensity of violence, the international community has turned their focus to the country and
its actions. The recent news began with the TPLF preemptively striking a federal military facility
located in Tigray (Peters 2020) early in November. In the background, both parties, the Abiy
Administration and the TPLF leaders, do not see the other as legitimate. Seeing this as a major
national security threat, the Abiy administration responded with a full military offensive.
However, due to the communications shutdown, news after those events is hard to verify from
both the administration and TPLF side.
In the week of November 28th, 2020, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed released a statement
alerting the international community that the war was over and that the military successfully took
the town of Mekelle, the capital of Tigray. However, the leader of the TPLF, Debretsion
Gebremicheal, claims the opposite and said that “the fighting is not over, and ‘we are sure we
will win’” (Leader of Tigray’s forces tells Ethiopia PM to ‘stop the madness’).
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Unfortunately, in the background of this violence has been violations against humanity
during and outside of the war. Again, due to the communications shutdown it is difficult to verify
news coming out of Ethiopia, however reports show refugees fleeing from the Tigray region into
Sudan. These same refugees report that both sides of the conflict are committing atrocities
against civilians, and that much of the killings are “based on ethnicity” and specifically in Mai
Kadra witness reported that forces loyal to the TPLF were responsible for the massacres
committed against non-Tigrayan laborers (Burke & Salih 2020).
III.

Through transparent, inclusive institutions:
As mentioned before, the two major actors in the recent violence emitting from Ethiopia do

not see the other as legitimate which further emphasizes the importance of transparent and
inclusive institutions.
With the exception of 2005, elections since the establishment of ethnic federalism has lacked
the pluralization necessary for democratization. With the first elections in 1992, Ethiopia utilized
the new political map that established the ethnically defined regions which was consolidated in
1995 with EPRDF as the national party. With a comprehensive five-year plan, all EPRDF
candidates had similar platforms which allowed the party to dominate the political agenda and
arena. Every election cycle saw the repeated patterns of harassment and intimidation of
opposition parties and voters. By utilizing state resources, and withholding funds to parties, the
EPRDF used the system forged for the people against them.
There was no real competition in the elections until 2005, which saw the active
mobilization of the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF), the Coalition for Alternative
Forces for Peace and Democracy in Ethiopia (COAFPD), and the Coalition for Unity and
Democracy (CUD). These three all presented viable options to the Ethiopian people who

55

witnessed their first election with debates and competition for the citizens. While these parties
gained attention and support, most still expected the EPRDF to continue their winning streak by
controlling officials and incumbency benefits.
While the competing parties won some parliamentary seats, the EPRDF still won the
majority and responded with harsh policies to prevent a similar outcome in upcoming elections
by, throwing these parties into legal procedures to distract them from party building, restricted
independent media and civil society freedom, and the consolidation between the ruling party and
the government (Lyons 2010). This continued up to the most two recent elections (in 2010 and
2015) with the EPRDF winning almost 100% of the parliamentary seats as the “ruling coalition
completely controls all aspects of their daily life and permits no alternative political views”
(Horne 2015).
Following the appointment of the current Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed, the world has
turned its gaze to Ethiopia for the results in the next set of elections scheduled for August 2020.
Ahmed since coming into office in 2018, began his administration with various policies that
sought to liberalize Ethiopia. Ranging from his policy of Medemer (meaning to add or loosely
translated into coming together), to releasing journalists from prison, and establishing the
Prosperity Party, Ahmed represented a new beginning for Ethiopia. However, citing potential
dangers regarding the coronavirus, Ahmed has pushed back elections to 2021 which some parties
viewed as a power grab. This was manifested in the Tigray region, who held their regional
elections in September 2020 as an act of defiance against the current administration (Marks
2020). However, the Tigray elections was not the first sign of tension between this region and the
current administration. It is important to note that while the TPLF continues to win seats in the
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region, there is doubt on whether they actually represent the Tigray people due to the doubts
around their elections.
If Dr. Abiy Ahmed continues with the initial promise, and holds elections there is hope
that the election will be conducted properly and will have legitimate results. In the years of the
EPRDF, it brought together the four largest ethnic groups, and gave the remaining secondary
classification and treatment (Yibeltal 2019). In contrast, following the Medemer philosophy, Dr.
Ahmed and the new prosperity party has promised innovative solutions to compromise, and the
importance of incorporating voices that had been isolated from the political sphere.
However, given the current relationship with the TPLF, there is hesitance on whether the
TPLF will accept the results of the election, and doubts surrounding whether there will be postelection peace.
IV.

Regional Agenda
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Ethiopia and Eritrea ended the civil war on tense

terms with the former not accepting the results of the Algiers Peace Accord which granted
Badme to Eritrea. The military standoff was terminated when Dr. Ahmed signed the 2018 Peace
Accord with Afeworki. Shortly after the accord was signed, the two countries reopened
embassies, restored flight links, and allowed telephone calls between the two (Schemm 2018).
However, a 2019 analysis into their relations recognized that not much changed between the two
countries. Besides the lack of a looming military threat, the two reverted back to their norms as
both leaders have their set of domestic matters to focus on. The international hope has been that
by easing political tensions with the accord, it can allow for more sustainable progress on the
economic front (Stigant 2019).
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This is an interesting development when considering the current war with the TPLF, as
they claim President Afeworki is supporting the Ethiopian military forces. According to TPLF
leaders, that alignment was enough justification to carry out airstrikes into Asmara. Officials in
both countries have denied Eritrea’s military involvement in Ethiopia (Manek & Omer 2020),
however historically there have been tense relationships between the TPLF and EPLF during the
revolution against the Derg Regime.
Another vital regional relationship is that with Somalia. During the Scramble for Africa,
the European countries split greater Somalia into five regions and gave Menelik the region of
Ogaden (Elmi and Barise 2010). The Somalia point continued into Emperor Haile Selassie’s
regime, as he aimed to weaken the state by creating terminal disorder in Somalia. This trend was
heighted under Haile Mariam who added a military component to the foreign policy agenda. The
Derg regime began backing up armed resistance groups against the Siad Barre regime stationed
in Ethiopia (Mohamed 2018). While tensions and covert involvement in both countries remained
high after Haile Mariam, it was during this regime that Somalia invaded Ethiopia in 1977 in the
Ogaden War. At this point in history, Somalia had an advanced military than Ethiopia and
politically was more stable. What began as a Somali military offensive war, ended as a military
victory for Ethiopia with the support of the Soviets and Cubans. In the last two months of the
war, when Somali forces were fading, the sudden international assistance shifted the balance of
forces on the battlefield (Tareke 2000).
Historically, while the Ethiopian-Somalian relationship has always been tense, recently
both countries have taken measures to improve relations and increase stability within East
Africa. After the Peace Accord was signed in 2018 between Eritrea, and Ethiopia, the two
sparked a relationship with Somalia in January 2020. The three established a Joint Plan of Action
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to consolidate peace, ensure stability and security, with the end goal of promoting economic and
social development in the region (Makori 2020). These goals were visualized by established a
new regional block, the Horn of Africa Cooperation (HoAC). As mentioned previously in this
paper, there is already an abundance of regional organizations throughout the continent which
adds a layer of complexity for this trio. While it too soon to predict the efficiency of this
organization, and all three countries have different economic and political conditions, HoAC
provides an opportunity for Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia to counter the Kenyan dominated
Intergovernmental Authority on Development.
V.

Poverty Rates and Regional Relations
Another measure of domestic success is the countries poverty rates. A 2018 analysis in

Ethiopia’s economy demonstrates how the country has made progress towards decreasing
poverty. Between 2004 and 2017, economic growth averaged 10.5%, with real per capita GDP
doubling to $81 million by 2016. With the expansion of social services in education, health,
water, sanitation and infrastructure over the past decade and a half, Ethiopia has also experienced
similar increasing growth rates with capita income and domestic savings (Third United Nations
Decade for the Eradication of Poverty).
The World Bank Group’s 2020 Poverty Assessment demonstrates how this economic
growth has continued. However, the group’s assessment noted how the poverty reduction was
stronger in the urban areas, but weak in rural areas which still depend on the agricultural sector
for work and financial compensation (Teshome 2020). This report was published before the
severe locust situation plaguing East African countries, which has negatively damaged farmers
ability to utilize their land thus threatening food supply. Over the past 18 months, experts have
noted a prolonged wet season, which ushered the locust outbreak who follow periods of heavy
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rainfall that triggers vegetation in normally dry climates. With the rising consequences of climate
change, researchers believe these locust outbreaks will only increase in frequency and intensity
(A Plague of Locusts Has Descended on East Africa 2020).
While the rain brought the locusts into Ethiopia, it also brought national pride as the rain
filled the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) before the expected fill date. This dam is
located in the Beninshangul-Gumuz region about 40 kilometers from Sudan (The Grand
Renaissance Dam- Ethiopia’s Greatest Risk). The idea of this specific Dam originated in 2011
under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of the EPRDF. This was in response to Ethiopia having not
utilized the Nile’s Waters as equitably as the country believed to be fair. As the Nile is a shared
river of ten riparian states, many were concerned with Ethiopia’s intention with this body of
water. Specifically, Egypt and Sudan voiced their concerns as much of their civilization depends
and is built around the river. Initially, the central government did not release information or
answer the regions concerns over water supply and continued building the dam. This issue came
back to the international arena under Dr. Abiy Ahmed who stated that unilaterally, the country
will fill the dam regardless of an agreement being signed or not.
According to a report by the International Hydropower Association, the GERD is
expected to produce 6,450 megawatts of electricity once fully installed. Past the employment
necessary to build the dam, Ethiopia planned to have this project provide electricity to their
citizens and continue economic growth by selling excess electricity to neighboring countries. In
response to the worries over cutting off water supply, since the prime purpose of the Gerd is
hydroelectricity, Ethiopian officials have reaffirmed the Riparian states that the water will
continue to flow downstream once the reservoir has been filled (Mbaku 2020). However due to
the unilateral lens in which Ethiopia is viewing this project, many in the region worry of the
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country’s true intentions with the Dam and its true consequences for those dependent on the Nile
River.
While events are currently unfolding in Ethiopia that will determine its ability to be
classified a regional power, the country is sitting at a crucial point. At this current moment,
Ethiopia can either move into further democratic deepening or fall back into democratic erosion.
In terms of poverty reduction, it is clear that past economic policies and expansion of social
services has set Ethiopia on a path of continued economic growth, especially if the GERD
project’s revenue manifested as expected. Another point that requires close research is the
relationship between the TPLF and administration once communications are back, and news can
be verified. It is also crucial to separate the regional parties from the citizens, as historically there
has been discontent with the TPLF, but that should not always extend to discontent with the
broader Tigrayan civilians.
However, the most important factor is the influence and legacy of the current Ahmed
administration. Similar to the EPRDF after the Red Terror, Dr. Abiy Ahmed has the potential to
turn Ethiopia into a democratic example within the Horn of Africa, and the continent as a whole.
For this to be done, it is crucial that Ahmed learns from the mistakes of his predecessors, and to
acknowledge where the country historically has gone wrong, and how it can become better.
Ranging from Empress Yohannes, up until Prime Minister Zenawi, leaders have
neglected the voice of the many in favor for the few. If his relationships with Eritrea and Somalia
are a reflection of his ability to bridge historical gaps, Ahmed’s policy of Medemer might be able
to bridge the gaps that have plagued Ethiopia since its formations and allow this and following
generations to witness peace in their lifetime.
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